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Abstract
This study explores optimal pricing strategies in
games and other interactive digital goods under
incomplete information, when bundling is an option.
Drawing from research on the pricing of information
goods, we propose a pattern of optimal pricing
strategies in which hedonic characteristics affect the
utility of interactive digital goods and services. This is
a new approach to games, to treat them as a service to
determine pricing strategies. Findings reveal that
there is an optimal pricing solution for firms in the
gaming industry. This finding holds both in bundling
and non-bundling cases.
Utilizing analytical modeling methodology, we
propose pricing-inspired business strategies to the
firms operating in the digital gaming industry. Our
findings could also be applied to other hedonic
interactive digital goods and services. Overall, this
study contributes to the existing pricing theories in
digital services and information goods.

One of the most important motives for the game
developer to release new contents of the game is to
balance between getting desirable content delivered
and minimizing the annoyance caused to players. It is
obvious that game developers have the incentive to
deliver desirable content to players. Frequent release
of new content provides new excitement to players,
and invoke in game purchasing. For the annoyance
caused to players, it is not only referring to the hassle
caused by frequency update notifications, it also
includes the cost incurred when players are trying to
get used to the new contents or user interfaces. In
addition, frequent additions could complicate the
game. It could potentially harm in game social
interactions and deter new players [1].

1. Introduction
Content release strategy of the gaming industry
was almost identical to the physical goods prior to the
internet era. For example, once Super Mario is
released, all the game content is packed into a fixed
package, and the players did not get any new content
until Super Mario 2 cartridge is released (see figure 1.)
This strategy seems to be constrained by technology
of the game production rather than by business
motives. Moreover, connecting a digital service to a
physical good made it easier to utilize conventional
pricing models. Nowadays, game developers can
release new content to players whenever they want.
Many mobile apps or online games release new
updates in a matter of weeks, or even days. Given this
flexibility, determining optimized pricing and content
release strategies based on business motives has
become an important decision.
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Figure 1: Super Mario Series Cartridges

Our study aims to model this trade-off caused
frequent updates to generate revenue. We also
investigate how social interactions among gamers
could affect the developers’ optimal decision. Of
course, in practice, this analytical model should be
tested with empirical estimates so that we can know
more about how exactly the model works for different
types of games or different player pools.
The main contribution of this research study is to
clarify how several important mechanisms, which are
well known to the game developers, work together in
an economic model. For example, the game difficulty
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has to be at the correct level because if the game is too
difficult, it could deter new players. On the other hand,
if it is too easy, competitive players may leave. Also,
if the developers release new content too frequently
user do not have enough time to get used to them. Yet,
without new releases, the developer cannot response
to user’s preference accordingly. Leveraging the
nature of social interaction in the game makes it easier
for the players to learn about the new content and gain
the most out of it. None of these mechanisms is foreign
to the game industry. However, it is because these
mechanisms interact and affect each other, putting
them together makes the whole system very
complicated to analysis without a formal model. By
building an economic model with rational agent, we
can apply the tools we use in economics to learn about
to how the above mechanisms work.
Our analytical model also provides insight to
operational decisions (such as when and how much a
game developer should release new content.) In
addition, if they can release new content to a particular
group of players, how they should pick those players.
We hope that the model will provide us with a tool to
hint the answer to these questions and hint how the
decision be affected by the nature of player pool, size
of game, nature of game, companies’ fame, and the
cost of producing new contents.
Understanding the optimal content release
frequency is important for the game developers
provide good user experience for players. Our
preliminary investigation revealed that there is
substantial amount of comments in Google Play and
Apple App Store declaring the annoyance caused by
too frequent updates. In addition, there are even more
comments concerning not enough new content when
we are looking at the game-associated forums.
Finally, our analytical model hints the direction of
how making use of game data to improve bundling
decisions. As mentioned before, social interaction
plays an important role in determining optimal content
release strategy. Therefore, with the proper measure of
the degree of social interactions and other
characteristics of the game, we can determine the
strategy better. Big-data researchers in the gaming
industry can also benefit from this model. The insight
we get from an economic model can help us to narrow
down what we should be looking at in the sea of game
data.
In the recent years, online games and software as a
service have been popular research topics. However,

to our knowledge, this is the first paper investigating
pricing strategies games as a service.

2. Literature Review
Contemporary games typically utilize cloudcomputing technologies. The gaming industry has
been embracing cloud computing because of its
reduced operational costs, flexibility, scalability, rapid
deployment, remote access and mobility, access to
innovation, efficient use of computing resources, and
green computing [2]. Cloud computing has three
service models: Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS),
Platform as a Service (PaaS), and Software as a
Service (SaaS). Conventional digital games are
moving from away from physical software packages
(i.e., Cartridges and disks) to SaaS platforms. The new
SaaS based gaming platform is called cloud gaming,
or games as a service (GaaS) [3].
SaaS is not only a popular for gaming services, but
it also drives the overall growth of the cloud
computing industry. In 2016, SaaS applications
generated more than half of the cloud computing
industry revenue [4].
This study investigates the impact of interactive
digital goods pricing strategies on the sales revenues
of GaaS products. Therefore, this section discusses the
prior studies on price discount-based pricing and
bundling strategies.

2.1 SaaS – GaaS Intersection
Cloud computing, particularly SaaS, has been a
popular research topic in the last decade [5, 6, 7, 8, 9,
10]. Numerous studies have presented definitions of
major concepts, systems structures, stakeholders, and
technologies, as well as potential future research
topics in the cloud computing area [2, 4, 9]. However,
GaaS is rarely discussed in cloud computing research
primarily because it is covered under SaaS and other
emerging technology categories. Discussion of these
“emerging technology” classifications is essential for
information systems research as the managerial
aspects of cloud computing enhances capabilities and
performance of the information technology (IT)
artifact [11].
An alternative key study pillar of cloud computing
research is to discuss new gaming technologies that
can be offered through SaaS category. The overview
of GaaS is essential to investigate these new
technologies and capabilities related to cloud
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computing and provide an overarching picture for the
pricing of these emerging technologies [2, 12].
Prior research has already addressed perception,
adoption, privacy and security issues regarding the
SaaS concept [13, 14, 15], yet we were not able to
identify any studies on business models or pricing
research on SaaS.

2.2 Pricing Strategies
Game pricing strategies include bundling and price
discounts. Price discount is so essential, most popular
and effective pricing strategy employed to increase
sales is freemium. Giving away the initial product free
affects the evaluation of gamers on product utility [16,
17]. Contemporary literature has shown a positive
impact of the price discount promotion on the gamer’s
value perception of the product, intention to purchase
and purchase behavior, as well as the revenue
performance of the seller. Impulse buying also has a
predominant effect on sales increase, and it has been
investigated in a number of digital goods domains [16,
18].
The ubiquitous property of the GaaS domain has
unsurprisingly expanded the gaming market. Mobile
games are the highest-earning segment in the SaaS
domain when direct and indirect revenues are
considered. For example, the steady increase in the
number of mobile phone users playing online games
have been and easily observable in our classrooms. In
addition, ad-hoc surveys we conducted over the years
indicates that gamers are getting more and more
comfortable for paying for bundled services and
freemium digital interactive goods [4].
Recent seminal articles we identified in the pricing
of bundling products mainly utilized empirical
methods such as Mishra and Mishra [19]. However,
there has been earlier studies that used analytical
modeling [20]. Despite these relevant studies,
anecdotally, we observed that practitioners lack
analytical pricing and bundling strategies in the GaaS
domain. Perhaps, this is because prior studies on
discount-based pricing and bundling strategies
focused their impact on the perceived value of
products and the buying intention of gamers rather
than hedonic properties of games and other digital
goods.

3. Model
We characterize game markets with a competitive
classical two period model with a j number of
offerings. Initially, competing firms start with
asymmetric market shares, which is more realistic than
identical market shares. Next, we use this model to
investigate how prices and market shares would
change over time and to explain strategies for
advanced strategies that include bundling of GaaS
offerings. Figure 2, demonstrates the nature of our
gaming market.
Game
1
Game j
Firm
A

...

Game
1
Game
2

Game
3

Game
2

Game j
Firm
B

...

Game
3

Figure 2: Market Structure in the Game Market Model

Beyond the classical model, we expand the market
with GaaS services and time-inconsistent behavior.
The notation used in this paper is in Table 1.
Table 1. Notation
Term
u
i
t
𝑐𝑠
j
e
α
𝑝𝑡𝑖
𝑞𝑡𝑖

Definition
Gamer’s utility
Firm index: i ∈ {a, b}
Period: t ∈ {0,1,2}
Cost of switching: 𝑐𝑠 ~ U[0, θ]
GaaS index for bundling: j  {1, 2, 3, …}
Network effect on u
Marginal shifting cost
Price of firm i in period t
Quantity sold by firm i in period t

The gaming market are served by two firms (𝑎 and
𝑏) with asymmetric initial market shares:
0 ≤ 𝑞0𝑏 < 0.5 < 𝑞0𝑎 ≤ 1
The asymmetric market share assumption benefits
the model in two ways. First, it provides a more
realistic representation of current GaaS markets.
Second, it covers a wider range of theoretical scenarios
than an equal-market-share case.
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We also assume that, in the market setting above,
there is a continuum of gamers uniformly distributed
between firms a and b. This horizontal differentiation
(which indicates that GaaS characteristics across
games are fixed) is due to inherent characteristics of
GaaS (such as gamer taste, ease of operation,
configurability, compatibility and security perception)
rather than the physical location.

𝑛2𝑎𝑎

𝑞1

𝜃

=∫(

∫

0

𝛼(2𝑥−1)+𝑝2𝑎 −𝑝2𝑏

𝑞1 (𝛼(1 − 𝑞𝑖1 ) − 𝑝2𝑎 + 𝑝2𝑏 + 𝜃)
𝜃
Gamers switching from firm a to firm b:
=

𝑛2𝑏𝑎 = 𝑞1 − 𝑛2𝑎𝑎

3.1 Basic Model
=

We consider a one-shot game theoretical model in
which firms commit prices p1, p2. Gamers make
purchase decisions based on their hedonic utilities. Let
𝑝𝑡𝑖 represent the price of firm i in period t. The term 𝑥 𝑖
is the distance of the gamer from buying firm i. The
indifferent gamer for firm a in the second period can
be characterized as:
𝑎

𝑢 − 𝛼𝑥 −

𝑝2𝑎

𝑎

= 𝑢 − 𝛼(1 − 𝑥 ) −

𝑝2𝑏

−𝑠
=

∫

𝑞1

𝛼(1−2𝑥)−𝑝2𝑎 +𝑝2𝑏

1
𝑑𝑠) 𝑑𝑥
𝜃

(1 − 𝑞1 )(𝛼𝑞1 + 𝑝2𝑎 − 𝑝2𝑏 + 𝜃)
𝜃

𝑛2𝑎𝑏 = 1 − 𝑞1 − 𝑛2𝑏𝑏
=

(𝑞1 − 1)(𝛼𝑞1 + 𝑝2𝑎 − 𝑝2𝑏 )
𝜃

Market share for firm a at the end of period 2:
𝑞2𝑎 = 𝑛2𝑎𝑎 + 𝑛2𝑎𝑏

𝑢 − 𝛼(1 − 𝑥 𝑏 ) − 𝑝2𝑏 = 𝑢 − 𝛼𝑥 𝑏 − 𝑝2𝑎 − 𝑠

= 𝑞1 +

We can determine the new allocation of the market
shares for firm a and b at the end of the second period
by finding the quantity of switching gamers. To find
second term market shares in terms of second period
prices, we start with switching costs:
𝑝2𝑎

−

𝑞2𝑏 = 𝑛2𝑏𝑏 + 𝑛2𝑏𝑎
= 1 − 𝑞1 +

𝑝2𝑏

𝑝2𝑎 − 𝑝2𝑏
𝜃

Firm j maximizes its second period profit.
𝑗

𝑗𝑘

Let 𝑛𝑡 be the quantity of gamers who bought from
k in period t-1, and firm j in period t. For example,
gamers who switched to firm b from firm a in period 2
are represented as 𝑛2𝑏𝑎 .

𝑝2𝑏 − 𝑝2𝑎
𝜃

Market share for firm b at the end of period 2:

𝑠 𝑏 = 𝛼(1 − 2𝑥 𝑏 ) − 𝑝2𝑎 + 𝑝2𝑏

Gamers staying with firm a:

= ∫(

Gamers switching from firm b to firm a:

Firm b’s indifferent gamer is:

𝑠 = 𝛼(2𝑥 − 1) +

𝜃

1

𝑛2𝑏𝑏

We use backward induction to find equilibrium
prices and quantities sold to represent market shares.
Our primary goal is to determine if there is an optimal
solution for firm revenues and pricing.

𝑎

𝑞1 (𝛼(𝑞𝑖1 − 1) + 𝑝2𝑎 − 𝑝2𝑏 )
𝜃

Gamers staying with firm b:

This indifferent gamer boundary determines new
market shares for firm a and b at the end of the second
period. In the cloud computing industry, utility is
derived from using per unit of service but in the
baseline model, we do not allow for differentiated
services.

𝑎

1
𝑑𝑠) 𝑑𝑥
𝜃

𝑗 𝑗

max 𝜋2 = 𝑝2 𝑞2
𝑝

First order conditions give us equilibrium prices
as:
𝑝2𝑎∗ =

(1 + 𝑞1 )𝜃
3
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(2 − 𝑞1 )𝜃
=
3
Equilibrium quantities sold are:
𝑞2𝑎∗ =
=

(1 + 𝑞1 )
3

(2 − 𝑞1 )
3

As a result of the profit maximization where
gamers may switch, we obtain second period profits as
a function of quantities sold in the first period:
𝜋2𝑎∗ =
𝜋2𝑏∗

(1 + 𝑞1 )2 𝜃
9

(2 − 𝑞1 )2 𝜃
=
9

Total profits can be found as a function of initial
quantities sold and switching costs:

𝜋1𝑏∗ =

(13 + 9𝑞0 )(5𝜃 + 7𝑞0 𝜃)
529

(10 − 9𝑞0 )(18𝜃 − 7𝑞0 𝜃)
529

Theorem 1: There exists a solution for the
maximum revenue in single-game GaaS markets, thus
there are rational pricing strategies for firms 𝑎 and 𝑏.
This is a unique equilibrium where firms 𝑎 and 𝑏
pursue rational strategies and gamers purchase in
equilibrium.
One of the main objectives of any firm is the
market share. Obviously, the ultimate market shares
for firm a and b depends on initially sold units but
interestingly they approximate each other regardless
of the initial value.

3.2 Bundle Model
In our model setup, there are i firms in j games of
the market. Gaming markets develop over time,

0

𝑎
0

𝑞0𝑎
𝑒11 > 0

𝑞0𝑎

𝑞0𝑏
𝑒1𝑗 = 0

𝑞0𝑏

𝑎

1
𝑏
1
𝑏

Game j

𝜋1𝑎∗ =

We consider a two-period pricing game with two
firms. Price 𝑝𝑡𝑖 represents the price of firm 𝑖 in period
𝑡. Gamers make purchase decisions based on their
utilities. The term x 𝑖 is the distance of the gamer
buying the service from firm 𝑖. In addition, the term
cs represents any costs incurred to switch. The initial
picture looks as shown in figure 3:

Game 1

Next, we follow the same procedure for period 1.
First, we identify the indifferent gamers to find
𝑗
switching costs si in terms of 𝑥𝑖 and prices. Then we
solve the maximization problem for the first period
profits to find equilibrium prices and quantities sold.

generally with the introduction of a disruptive
technology because network externalities require time
to affect a market. For example, it took Nintendo years
to develop a GaaS enabled ecosystem and benefit from
hedonic characteristics of online interactive services
(device and GaaS) of the gaming market. Therefore,
most game markets start with independent GaaS firms
serving each game. The best representation of a precompetition gamer market is the case where firms
independently serve separate games to the market. In
short, in the basic model, we consider that bundling
externalities do not come into effect. On the other
hand, information goods inherently exhibit network
externalities within a market [21]. Therefore, in the
basic model we consider GaaS to exhibit delayed
positive network externalities despite the fact that
cross-market externalities do not exist.

Figure 3. Illustration of the basic model

For simplicity, we denote 𝑒11 as e, and omit the
𝑖
𝑖
subscript 𝑗 in 𝑝𝑗𝑡
and 𝑞𝑗𝑡
. The net utility of the
indifferent gamer for firm a in the second period can
be characterized as:
𝑢 − 𝛼𝑥 𝑎 − 𝑝2𝑎 + 𝑒𝑞1𝑎 =
𝑢 − 𝛼(1 − 𝑥 𝑎 ) − 𝑝2𝑏 − 𝑐𝑠𝑎 + 𝑒𝑞1𝑏
The indifferent gamer determines new market
shares for firm 𝑎 and 𝑏 at the end of the second period.
We use backward induction to find equilibrium
prices and quantities sold to represent market shares.
First, we start with the second period solution, and
then we solve the maximization problem for the first
period profits to find equilibrium prices and quantities
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𝑞1𝑎 (𝛼(1 − 𝑞1𝑎 ) − 𝑝2𝑎 + 𝑝2𝑏 + 𝑒(𝑞1𝑎 − 𝑞1𝑏 ) + 𝜃)
𝜃

sold. As mentioned in table 1, 𝑞𝑡𝑖 denotes quantity sold
by firm 𝑖 in period 𝑡.

=

The net utility of firm 𝑏’s indifferent gamer in the
second period is:

Gamers switching from firm 𝑎 to 𝑏:

𝑢−
𝑢−

𝛼(1 − 𝑥 − 𝑝2𝑏 + 𝑒𝑞1𝑎
𝛼𝑥 𝑏 − 𝑝2𝑎 − 𝑐𝑠𝑏 + 𝑒𝑞1𝑏
𝑏)

𝑏𝑎
𝑎𝑎
𝑛2𝑗
= 𝑞1𝑎 − 𝑛2𝑗

=
=

We can determine the new allocation of market
share for firm 𝑎 and 𝑏 at the end of the second period
by determining the quantity of switching gamers. To
find market shares for the second term, we start by
identifying gamers who switch:

Gamers staying with firm 𝑏:

=

𝑎𝑎
𝑛2𝑗

𝜃

=∫ (

∫

0

𝛼(2𝑥−1)+𝑝2𝑎 −𝑝2𝑏 +𝑒(𝑞1𝑏 −𝑞1𝑎 )

1
𝑑𝑠) 𝑑𝑥
𝜃

= ∫(

∫

𝑞1𝑎

𝛼(1−2𝑥)−𝑝2𝑎 +𝑝2𝑏 +𝑒(𝑞1𝑏 −𝑞1𝑎 )

1
𝑑𝑠) 𝑑𝑥
𝜃

(𝑞1𝑎 − 1)(𝑞1𝑎 (𝛼 + 𝑒) − 𝑞1𝑏 𝑒 + 𝑝2𝑎 − 𝑝2𝑏 + 𝜃)
𝜃

Gamers switching from firm 𝑏 to firm 𝑎:
𝑛2𝑎𝑏 = 1 − 𝑞1𝑎 − 𝑛2𝑏𝑏
=

(𝑞1𝑎 − 1)(𝑞1𝑎 (𝛼 + 𝑒) − 𝑞1𝑏 𝑒 + 𝑝2𝑎 − 𝑝2𝑏 )
𝜃

Market share for firm 𝑎 at the end of period 2:
𝑞2𝑎 = 𝑛2𝑎𝑎 + 𝑛2𝑎𝑏

We assume that 𝛼 < 𝑝2𝑎 − 𝑝2𝑏 to avoid the negative
probability of switching and an interior location 𝑥 for
the gamer. This assumption not only improves
tractability in the general model, but also it is a better
representation of reality. Price 𝑝 in our model includes
inherent penalties of switching, therefore a gamer’s
switching cost will be less than the price difference, or
else the gamer would not switch. These conditions are
checked for all possible cases (negative and positive)
of optimal solutions.

𝑞1𝑎

𝜃

1
𝑏𝑏
𝑛2𝑗

Gamers will switch from firm 𝑎 to firm 𝑏 when
𝑐𝑠𝑎 < α(2x a − 1) + pa2 − pb2 + 𝑒(𝑞1𝑏 − 𝑞1𝑎 ).
Similarly, firm 𝑏 gamers switch to firm 𝑎 when 𝑐𝑠𝑏 <
𝛼(1 − 2𝑥 𝑏 ) − 𝑝2𝑎 + 𝑝2𝑏 + 𝑒(𝑞1𝑏 − 𝑞1𝑎 ). Please note
that switching cost can be different for each gamer
since it is a distribution. Such switching costs bring
additional trade-offs over the heterogeneity of tastes.
For example, consider two gamers where one is closer
to firm 𝑎 in tastes. Normally we would expect the
closer gamer to stay with firm 𝑎 and the farther gamer
to switch, however, if the closer gamer’s switching
cost is low, and the farther gamer’s switching cost is
high, then the farther gamer can stay with the firm
because of high switching costs and the closer gamer
may switch to the rival’s service.

𝑘𝑙
Let 𝑛𝑡𝑗
be the quantity of gamers who bought from
𝑙 in period 𝑡 − 1, and firm k in period 𝑡, in market
game j. For example, gamers who switched to firm 𝑏
𝑏𝑎
from firm 𝑎 in period 2 are represented as 𝑛2𝑗
.
Therefore, gamers staying with firm 𝑎 can be found
through the following calculation:

𝑞1𝑎 (𝛼(𝑞1𝑎 − 1) + 𝑝2𝑎 − 𝑝2𝑏 − 𝑒(𝑞1𝑎 − 𝑞1𝑏 ))
𝜃

= 𝑞1𝑎 +

𝑝2𝑏 − 𝑝2𝑎 + 𝑒(2𝑞1𝑎 − 1)(𝑞1𝑎 − 𝑞1𝑏 )
𝜃

Market share for firm 𝑏 at the end of period 2:
𝑞2𝑏 = 𝑛2𝑏𝑏 + 𝑛2𝑏𝑎
= 1 − 𝑞1𝑎 +

𝑝2𝑎 − 𝑝2𝑏 − 𝑒(2𝑞1𝑎 − 1)(𝑞1𝑎 − 𝑞1𝑏 )
𝜃

Firm 𝑖 maximizes its second period profit.
𝑚𝑎𝑥 𝜋2𝑖 = 𝑝2𝑖 𝑞2𝑖
𝑝

First order conditions give us equilibrium prices
as:
𝑝2𝑎∗ =

(1 + 𝑞1𝑎 )𝜃 + 𝑒(2𝑞1𝑎 − 1)(𝑞1𝑎 − 𝑞1𝑏 )
3

𝑝2𝑏∗ =

(2 − 𝑞1𝑎 )𝜃 − 𝑒(2𝑞1𝑎 − 1)(𝑞1𝑎 − 𝑞1𝑏 )
3
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Equilibrium quantities sold are:
𝑞2𝑎∗ =

(1 + 𝑞1𝑎 ) 𝑒(2𝑞1𝑎 − 1)(𝑞1𝑎 − 𝑞1𝑏 )
+
3
3𝜃

𝑞2𝑏∗ =

(2 − 𝑞1𝑎 ) 𝑒(2𝑞1𝑎 − 1)(𝑞1𝑎 − 𝑞1𝑏 )
+
3
3𝜃

As a result of the second period profit
maximization, we obtain profits as a function of
quantities sold in the first period:
(𝑒(2𝑞1𝑎 − 1)(𝑞1𝑎 − 𝑞1𝑏 ) + (1 + qa1 )θ)2
9θ

πb∗
2 =

(𝑒(2𝑞1𝑎 − 1)(𝑞1𝑎 − 𝑞1𝑏 ) − (2 − qa1 )θ)2
9θ

0

𝑞0𝑎

𝑞0𝑏

𝑎

𝑏

𝑒1𝑗 > 0

0

𝑞0𝑎

𝑞0𝑏

𝑎
The net utility of the indifferent gamer for firm 𝑎
in the first period is:
𝑢 − 𝛼𝑥 𝑎 − 𝑝1𝑎 + 𝑒𝑞1𝑎 =
𝑢 − 𝛼(1 − 𝑥 𝑎 ) − 𝑝1𝑏 − 𝑐𝑠 + 𝑒𝑞1𝑏
The net utility of firm 𝑏’s indifferent gamer is:
𝑢 − 𝛼(1 − 𝑥 𝑏 ) − 𝑝1𝑏 + 𝑒𝑞1𝑎 =
𝑢 − 𝛼𝑥 𝑏 − 𝑝1𝑎 − 𝑐𝑠 + 𝑒𝑞1𝑏
Subsequently, we solve the maximization problem
for the first period profits to find equilibrium prices
and quantities sold. Tracing previous steps shows that
there are optimal pricing strategies for firm 𝑎 and 𝑏 in
the basic model.
Theorem 2: There exists a solution for the
maximum revenue in bundled GaaS markets, thus
there are rational pricing strategies for firms 𝑎 and 𝑏.

3.3 Pricing with GaaS Externalities
Under the assumption that positive network
externalities are present across GaaS, we introduce a
more sophisticated parameter e. In this case, 𝑒ℎ𝑗
represents the delayed positive network externalities
of the quantity sold in market game h on market game
j. This externality means that the utility of the gamer
benefits from a compatible game sold in a connected
market. For example, when a firm such as Nintendo

1

1
𝑏

Game j

For the first period maximization problem, we
follow a process similar to the second period. First, we
identify the indifferent gamers to find switching costs
𝑐𝑠 in terms of 𝑥 𝑖 and prices.

The main challenge for such a platform is to get the
pricing right. In our second case, we develop a pricing
strategy when cross-market externalities are enabled
though technologies such as GaaS. Here is an
illustration of how cross-market externalities affect
our model.

Game 1

πa∗
2 =

sells an online game service, it has the potential to
affect sales of complementary digital goods and
services. Complementary service offerings and social
characteristics of collaborative games increase the
utility for the gamer. This benefit creates value both
for the user playing a single game and for the gamer
using bundled services.

Figure 2. Illustration of the initial condition for the
extended model: cross-market externality

We update gamer utilities and the indifferent
gamer equation for firm 𝑎 in period 2 becomes:
𝑢 − 𝛼𝑥 𝑎 − 𝑝2𝑎 + 𝑒ℎ𝑗 𝑞1𝑎 = 𝑢 − 𝛼(1 − 𝑥 𝑎 ) − 𝑝2𝑏 −
𝑐𝑠 + 𝑒ℎ𝑗 𝑞1𝑏 .
Similarly, the indifferent gamer for firm 𝑏 in
period 2 can be characterized as:
𝑢 − 𝛼(1 − 𝑥 𝑏 ) − 𝑝2𝑏 + 𝑒ℎ𝑗 𝑞1𝑏 =
𝑢 − 𝛼𝑥 𝑏 − 𝑝2𝑎 − 𝑐𝑠 + 𝑒ℎ𝑗 𝑞1𝑎
Next, we solve the base model with the externality
extension.
With cross-market externalities, gamers will
switch from firm 𝑎 to firm 𝑏 when 𝑐𝑠𝑎 < 𝛼(2𝑥 𝑎 −
1) + 𝑝2𝑎 − 𝑝2𝑏 + 𝑒ℎ𝑗 (𝑞1𝑏 − 𝑞1𝑎 ). Similarly, firm b
gamers switch to firm a when 𝑐𝑠𝑏 < 𝛼(1 − 2𝑥 𝑏 ) −
𝑝2𝑎 + 𝑝2𝑏 + 𝑒ℎ𝑗 (𝑞1𝑎 − 𝑞1𝑏 ).
We solve the profit maximization problem for
prices and units sold similar to the previous section.
Tracing the steps in section 3.1 with 𝑒ℎ𝑗 ∈ (0,1), we
find that:
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(𝑞2𝑎∗ )𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠−𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 > (𝑞2𝑎∗ )𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑐 𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙 > 0
𝑒𝑥𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠

(𝑝2𝑎∗ )𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠−𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 > (𝑝2𝑎∗ )𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑐 𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙 > 0
𝑒𝑥𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠

Proposition 1: Cross-market externalities increase
the benefits to the market leader in terms of quantities
sold.
Proposition 2: The market leader can charge a
higher price in the presence of positive cross-market
externalities without losing market share.
Please note that these results only hold for the
market share leader firm, because the externality
effects across the periods conflict with the intermarket externality effects for the follower firm.

4. How to test findings empirically?
Analytical models are very useful to define
sterilized relationships between constructs. On the
other hand, studies that utilize pure analytical
modeling methodology may raise a healthy skepticism
among the audience. This section is included to
provide guidance, and outline, how the key parts of the
analytical model presented in this paper could be
tested empirically, and validated.
First, it is essential to transform propositions in this
study into testable (i.e. rejectable) assumptions or
implications (hypotheses.) For example, proposition 1
(Cross-market externalities increase the benefits to the
market leader in terms of quantities sold) is a great
candidate to become a measurable and testable
hypothesis. The dependent variable “quantities sold”
is already measured in most firms, and externalities
could be measured through surveys or customer panels
to understand customers’ utility and the role of
network externality. Then, linear regression (or a more
complex statistical method) could be used to validate
the model.
Second, the contribution and inferences drawn
from the model and the empirical validation must be
aligned. Particularly, inferences drawn from a
potential empirical validation should be related to the
inferences drawn from the model.
Third, it may be useful to keep in mind that
empirical findings might not validate the analytical
model. This is a finding in itself. Researchers must be
critical in their thinking. As aforementioned,
analytical models help us investigate sterilized

relationships between constructs, but reality is never
sterile. If empirical tests show a different trend, it may
be useful to investigate why and under which cases
analytical findings hold, and when do they deviate.

5. Conclusions
Overall, in this study, we are investigating how
GaaS firms can make pricing decisions to benefit from
bundling and externalities to maximize game revenues
and increase gamer utility. This question is, of course,
multi-faceted. Drawing on the capabilities of
analytical modeling, we have identified several related
results, which currently interest theory and practice.
They concern monetization strategies in GaaS market,
and economic principles of game design. Our findings
could also support business model design and strategic
decision-making in practice.
Advances in information technologies provided us
with smart services that exhibit complex interactions.
Cross-game externalities such as the ones in the
Games as a Service (GaaS) enabled markets are an
example of these complex properties. For example,
making modular and connected GaaS offerings benefit
from externalities. In our study, we developed a model
incorporating both within-market and cross-game
externality effects in an industry that has multiple
games. To our knowledge, this is the first model about
GaaS markets. Therefore, this study also contributes to
the e-Commerce literature as the first analytical GaaS
pricing model.
On the other hand, practitioners in the GaaS
enabled market are challenged in developing viable
pricing models in such complex business scenarios.
Practitioners currently use pricing models developed
for conventional service models. This study offers a
new approach, supported by a novel model, for pricing
smart services enabled by GaaS.
Our findings suggest that, even with the presence
of positive and delayed network externalities in a
gaming market, there is a solution for the optimal
revenue. Moreover, we find that cross-market
externalities provide opportunities for those firms who
are willing to operationalize their pricing and market
share strategies around them. Specifically, firms that
are willing to identify cross-market externalities can
benefit in terms of higher market share and prices.
Perhaps firms such as Apple or Google have already
benefited from externalities by instinctually creating
ecosystems connected to games. If there is such a
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phenomenon, we explain the rationale behind it with
an analytical model.
The main limitations of this research are due to the
analytical modeling methodology we employed. First,
arguments and propositions in this study have not been
tested empirically and they are bound by the model
assumptions. For example, we anticipated network
externalities would be positive, which is aligned with
the e-Commerce and economics literature [22, 23, 24].
However, in real life, we observe a diminishing rate of
return for the externality effect, and even sometimes,
it is negative. Indeed, an example of negative network
externalities has been the departure of young social
media users of Facebook games when parents became
users and sent game play requests to their children.
Finally, but maybe most importantly, data
collected from such smart devices would lead to
micro-segmentation and advanced marketing methods
that would target individual gamers rather than wide
segments. Analyzing the data collected from gaming
devices, firms can direct promotions to extract a higher
utility from gamers. To summarize, our model can be
improved by considering synergies other than positive
network externalities among the sides of a GaaSenabled smart services market.
Each one of the limitations in this study provides
an opportunity for a future research direction. First, in
this study, we use a relatively simplified model of the
network externality concept. Our model could be
improved by considering a more sophisticated form
(probably concave) externality function. Second, the
model is based on two periods. Extending the time
horizon to include multiple periods can provide
additional insights into the impact of network
externalities on gamers’ utility functions. Finally, as
outlined in the previous section, validation of our
findings creates an opportunity for an empirical study
for the pricing of GaaS enabled markets.
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